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Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization in Regulated Markets
Kenneth C. Baseman
Decisions by the Federal Communications Commission and other regu-
latory agencies to encourage competition in regulated markets have led
to extensive consideration of the problem of cross-subsidization. In
particular, the FCC has concerned itself (in docket 18128) with whether
American Telephone and Telegraph could increase prices in its monopoly
MTS-WATS markets in order to finance "unfair" competition against
firms competing with AT&T in other markets.
1 The same issue arises
in postal service. The U.S. Postal Service is a monopoly carrier for
first class mail and competes with various firms in parcel delivery.
AT&T's position before the FCC and Congress is one which I suspect
many economists would find appealing, at least at first blush:
2 that as
long as revenues in competitive markets cover incremental costs, the
pricing structure cannot be said to involve cross-subsidization even though
the resulting prices exclude potential competitors from markets nominally
open to entry. Revenues in excess of incremental cost in competitive
markets allow those markets to make some contribution toward covering
costs that are common to the provision of both competitive and monopoly
services. Therefore, prices charged to consumers of monopoly services
can be lower than if joint provision of the various services were not
allowed. Further, consumers of competitive services are better off than
if the monopolist's price were disallowed, since that price is lower than
the price competing firms can offer. Therefore, correct application of
the incremental-cost test ensures that consumers in all markets are better
off with joint provision of the services.
My argument is that the above position, despite its intuitive appeal,
is incorrect. I shall demonstrate that the combination of franchise mo-
nopoly markets and an incremental-cost pricing rule in competitive
markets cannot be expected, in general, to lead the industry to the most
efficient market structure. In particular, it will be shown that the above
set of rules may allow the multiproduct firm to successfully monopolize
both its own franchise monopoly markets and the competitive markets
even when joint production is absolutely inefficient. In such situations,
the price in the monopoly markets will be seen to lie above the cost of
serving those markets alone. The results are then interpreted as state-Baseman 330
ments about cross-subsidization by reference to Faulhaber's (1975a)
game-theoretic approach to cross-subsidization.
A Simple Numerical Example
Suppose we have two products for which the demands are perfectly
price-inelastic, and that the cost functions are
C(0,q2) = 40,
Let S denote an input, used by the joint monopolist, that is necessary
for the production of either service. Expenditures on S are common costs
for the joint monopolist. Let A{ denote inputs that are used only in the
production of service i. Expenditures on A{ are attributable to service i.
Suppose all input prices equal unity.
Now let the two-product monopolist's most efficient input choice,




Let service 2 be the joint monopolist's franchise monopoly market. The
incremental cost of additionally serving market 1 is given by
C
m{quq2) - C
m(0,q2) = 90 - 70 = 20. (1)
The monopolist can clearly pick p™ to satisfy an incremental-cost rule,
while beating the competition in market 1 by choosing p™ such that
20 < /?? < 40.
To satisfy a break-even constraint, the monopolist then chooses p™ to
satisfy
90 - pT = p2 > 50. (2)
The final result is a joint monopoly over both markets, with total costs
10 above what they would be with separate production.Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization 331
Now suppose that the monopolist's cost-minimizing input choice,




Since the incremental cost of serving market 1 is now 42, it would appear
that an inefficient joint monopoly could not pass an incremental-cost
test. However, suppose that the elasticity of substitution between the
inputs S and Ai is greater than zero (that is, suppose we are not dealing
with a fixed-proportions technology). Then an inefficient joint monopoly





Total costs are now 96, reflecting the fact that we have moved away
from the cost-minimizing point for joint production. However, since Ax
is less than 40, joint monopoly can now be successful.
In remainder of the article I will distinguish, as was done above,
between two types of inefficient joint monopoly: type 1, in which the
monopolist's cost-minimizing input choice, using the joint-production
technology, allows him to pass an incremental-cost test, and type 2, in
which the joint monopolist cannot pass an incremental-cost test using
the cost-minimizing input combination for joint production, but input
substitutability allows the joint monopolist to serve both markets while
satisfying an incremental-cost pricing rule.
More Examples of Inefficient Joint Monopoly
In this section, a two-product model will be used to further develop the
notion of inefficient joint monopoly. The assumptions of the model,
except for subadditivity and the specification of the monopolist's cost
function, match the assumptions made in Faulhaber's (1975a) work on
cross-subsidization.Baseman 332
Assumptions
Al. The demand functions are given by
Qi = QiiPuPz) 0" = 1.2),
with
A2. The cost functions for independent production of the two commo-
dities are given by C
i(g1,0) and C




A3. The joint monopolist's cost function is given by
C
m(qltq2) = min C
m(S,Al,A2;q1,q2,pAi,pA2,ps), (3)
S,Al,A2
where S, At, and A2 retain their definitions from the preceding section.
The underlying production function is given by
q<? = q?(S,A2).













A5. The monopolist is confined to price pairs for which dn
m/dpj > 0
(i = 1,2). The monopolist's n
m = 0 locus might look something like that
depicted in figure 7.1. Price pairs along the arc AB satisfy dn
m/dpi > 0.
The assumption is plausible in that, even if the firm is indifferent to
whether or not its prices lie on an undominated portion of the n
m = 0
locus, the regulator will attempt to force the firm toward the "low"
price pairs on AB. In addition, along any n
m = k > 0 locus, a profit-
maximizing monopolist faced with either direct or indirect competition
(in the form of a substitute product offered by a competing firm) has
an incentive to choose the "low" price pairs for which dn
m/dp{ > 0.Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization 333
Pi
Figure 7.1 Region of non-negative profit for a two-product monopolist.
Pi
Figure 7.2 Regions of non-negative profit for two single-product firms.
We are also assuming that, at the noncooperative zero-profit equili-
brium for separate production, dn
l/dpi > 0 for i = 1,2. This would be
the case if the profit functions n
l(Pi',pj) were concave in their own prices.
Figure 7.2 shows regions of non-negative profits are shown for firms
producing independently (with dq
ljdp} > 0 and decreasing average costs).
At C, a price increase by either firm would yield it positive profits. At
any other zero-profit solution for the two firms, such as Z), dn
l/dpi < 0
for at least one of the firms (in this case it is firm 2). C dominates other
solutions to n
l(p1,p2) = 0 for / = 1,2, since, at the other solutions,
entry would force price reductions in at least one of the markets.
We know from assumption A4 that the joint monopolist will lose
money at (p\ ,p
c2), since the two independent firms just break even at
that point and the monopolist incurs larger costs to produce the same
outputs. Denote by L the joint monopolist's losses at (p\,p
c2). R
m is the
monopolist's revenue function. Thus,Baseman 334
= R
m{p\,p\) ~ C
m{q\{p\,p\), ql{p\tp\)) = L < 0. (4)
Now assume that market 2 is a franchise monopoly market for our
joint monopolist, but that entry is allowed in market 1. Can the joint
monopolist, given a franchise monopoly in market 2 and an incremental-
cost pricing rule in market 1, find a price pair that yields non-negative
profits? That price pair (/?",/?") must satisfy the following conditions.
i. />™ < p*, where p* is the lowest price, given p™, at which a firm
serving only market 1 can break even.
4 A profit-maximizing monopolist
will always choose to satisfy this requirement with equality. This can be
most easily seen by referring back to figure 7.1. Positive profits occur
for the monopolist at price pairs in the interior of n
m — 0. Thus, if our
monopolist starts at some price pair on AB and finds his p™ more than
sufficient to prevent entry in market 1, he can increase profits by increasing
p™. Thus, condition i is replaced by condition Y:
V. p™ = pf. This result, which means that for a given value of/?™
profits are maximized at pf, will simplify the analysis, since p% can be
derived implicitly from p™ and we need deal with only the single decision
variable/?™.




5 in market 1, /?*, is given implicitly by
Pi = PI\RHPI,P?) - CHqAPuPf) = 0. (5)
The derivative dp%jdp™ is
dp
m2 dp? dqidp2\dpX dq.dp*
The denominator in the expression above is equal to dn^jdpf > 0 for
p* < p\. The numerators are non-negative, being the product of two
non-negative terms. Assumption A2 requires dC
i/dql < C^iq^jq^, and
equation (5) requires p* = C
l{ql)lql. Therefore, p\ > dC
lldq1. Also,
dqi/dp2 > 0 by assumption Al.
We now examine a candidate price vector (p*,p™) to see if the joint
monopolist can satisfy conditions i' through iii. At (p*^™) the joint





The change in the joint monopolist's profits when he moves from (p* =
p\ ,p





where w is a dummy variable of integration.








 U dp^ dp* dp? dp
A necessary condition for a successful joint monopoly is that equation
(8) be positive. If the monopolist cannot obtain an increase in profits via
an increase inp™,
6 his initial losses (L) can never be overcome.
For given specifications of the demand and cost functions, equation (8)
can be either positive or negative. Large unexploited monopoly profits in
the franchise monopoly market will help the joint monopolist, since then
dn
m/dp™ will be large. Similarly, large losses in market 1, given dp*, will
tend to hurt the joint monopolist. Large substitution effects (in demand)
and substantial scale economies for independent production of service 1
will hurt the joint monopolist, since these factors make \dpf/dp™\ large.
When demands are independent or when independent production is
done at constant cost, then dp*/dp™ = 0 and equation (8) reduces to
^ = ^ (9)
dp? dpt
This result is highly intuitive. Independent demands or constant costs
imply that changes in p™ will not affect the entry-preventing price in
market 1. Therefore, the only things that affect profits when p2 changes
are the changes in costs and revenues in market 2.
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Figure 7.3 A case where joint monopoly cannot succeed.
When equation (11) is not satisfied by the joint monopolist's cost-
minimizing input choices, given q™ and q™, the monopolist can turn to
type 2 monopolization. Let the joint monopolist substitute away from
Ax and toward S until the point is reached (if one exists) where pAiAx —
p*q™. Denote by Ax the largest value of Ax satisfying the incremental-
cost constraint. Because the monopolist's isoquants are assumed to be
convex, the total costs of supplying the two markets will increase with
this substitution. Denote by AC
m the change in costs:
AC
m = min C
m(A2,S;Auq^,q^) - min C
m(A1,A2,S;q
t?,q'2) > 0. (12)
Of course, the larger the elasticity of substitution, the smaller AC
m will
have to be in order to satisfy the incremental-cost pricing rule.
The joint monopolist will now succeed if
^dw - L - AC
m > 0. (13)
p\ Pi
The various possibilities for success or failure of inefficient joint
monopoly can be diagramed. Demands are assumed to be substitutes in
these figures. Figure 7.3 depicts a case where joint monopoly cannot
succeed. The n
m — 0 locus lies "northeast" of the point C because of
the superadditivity assumption. Joint monopoly cannot succeed, because
the undominated portion of the n
m = 0 locus lies entirely within the
nx > 0 region. At any price pair chosen by the monopolist, a firm offering
only service 1 can successfully underprice p™.
Figure 7.4 illustrates a situation where joint monopoly might succeed.
Because a n
m = k locus passes outside n^ > 0, price pairs (such as pointOpen Entry and Cross-Subsidization 337
ir2 >0
ir
m = k > 0
Figure 7.4 A case where joint monopoly might succeed.
E) can be chosen at which a firm serving only market 1 will not be viable.
If at any such point revenues exceed incremental costs, type 1 joint
monopoly is possible. If the incremental-cost rule is not satisfied at B, the
monopolist can attempt to satisfy the rule by substituting away from A t.
If there exists an A1 that satisfies the rule, and if k > AC
m, then a type
2 joint monopoly could survive. .
Type 1 versus Type 2 Joint Monopolies
I have found it convenient for heuristic purposes to define two different
types of joint monopolies. Both types (not just type 2) depend crucially
on the assumption of variable proportions. If it is true that joint produc-
tion is necessarily inefficient, then a cost-minimizing monopolist will
forgo joint production and operate two subsidiaries that produce their
services independently. Costs will be higher than under independent
production by separate firms, owing to the presumably small costs of
operating the holding company. To get from the holding company to a
case of type 1 joint monopoly, the monopolist must substitute away from
attributable inputs toward common inputs; otherwise the incremental-
cost pricing constraint can never be satisfied. This is not to say that the
distinction is purely heuristic. Type 1 joint monopolies could occur
whenever a monopolist fails to minimize costs, so long as the failure is
biased in the "right" direction. The failure could either be inadvertent
(that is, a result of x-inefficiency) or deliberate. There are reasons why
the monopolist might choose a technology other than the cost-minimizing
one. For example, Averch-Johnson input distortion and rate-base padding
are both due to decisions by the monopolist to choose input combinationsBaseman 338
Figure 7.5 The case of an inefficient single-product monopoly.
that do not minimize costs. The profitability of such choices, of course,
depends upon the monopolist's being subject to a rate-of-return con-
straint and not a break-even constraint.
The incentive the monopolist will have to monopolize both markets
(in either the type 1 or the type 2 case) also follows from the fact that
the profit constraint is given in the form of a limit on the allowed rate
of return. Averch and Johnson (1962) demonstrated that so long as the
allowed rate of return exceeds the cost of capital and additional profits
can be drawn from a monopoly market, a regulated monopolist will find
it profitable to serve additional markets even if incremental costs are not
covered in those markets. Serving such markets increases the size of the
rate base, thereby allowing total profits to rise. The monopolist can cover
any "losses" in competitive markets with additional revenues drawn from
the monopoly market.
The Results in Terms of Cost Functions
The results in the preceding sections can be illustrated by looking directly
at the cost functions. In figure 7.5 we assume that the monopolist has a
franchise monopoly over the first qx units of output, but that for subse-
quent units (q2 — <h) competition is allowed. The minimum-average-cost
curve is shown as AC. The inefficient monopolist's average-cost curve
is AC
m. The incremental cost for the monopolist of producing q2 — q\
(the area under MC
m) is less than the constant incremental cost of those
units when produced by another firm. The inefficient monopolist can
thus serve both markets. The market will look like a natural monopolyOpen Entry and Cross-Subsidization 339
market to a regulator who does not have knowledge of the full technology
set.
A similar result can be obtained in the multiproduct case. The assump-
tion that the joint monopolist is inefficient is stated algebraically as
C




If the joint monopolist passes an incremental-cost test in market 1 and
the monopolist chooses/?™ to "just" deter entry, we have
C
m(qltq2) ~ C







The monopolist's chosen technology will appear to be subadditive,
although the cost-minimizing technology is not. A regulator without
knowledge of the full technology set will think he is dealing with a
two-product natural monopoly.
These results are not surprising. Under an incremental-cost test,
incremental costs for each service will not sum up to total costs whenever
the average cost function is declining or, with several products, when
the cost function is subadditive. There will be a residual of common
costs that cannot be attributed to any service and that reflect the fact that
production of larger outputs allows the firm to realize lower average costs
of production. The substitution away from attributable inputs toward
common inputs thus requires the choice of a cost function that is "more
subadditive" than the cost function associated with the cost-minimizing
technology.
Inefficient Joint Monopoly and Cross-Subsidization
Readers familiar with Faulhaber's work on cross-subsidization have no
doubt recognized that the prices charged by our joint monopolist are
not subsidy-free. Faulhaber's basic insight is that cross-subsidization canBaseman 340
be neatly and elegantly analyzed by employing the theory of cooperative
games. The "players" of the game are the consumers in each market.
Joint monopoly production is the outcome of that game if the monopolist
chooses a price vector satisfying the core conditions. Among the core
conditions are the requirements that pf < pi—that is, the monopolist
must "beat" the prices available to each "player" if independent pro-
duction is chosen. Our joint monopolist clearly does not satisfy the
core conditions, since p™ > p\ • The price in market 2 is above "stand
alone" cost, and service 2 users are subsidizing consumers of service 1.
The franchise-monopoly rule prevents the consumers in market 2 from
withdrawing from the joint monopolist's "coalition." Even though joint
monopoly is inefficient and the prices are outside the core of the cooper-
ative game, a "cooperative" solution—joint monopoly—is forced upon
the users of service 2.
Open Entry
We have seen that a franchise monopolist can be inefficient and still
compete successfully in other markets even when subject to an incre-
mental-cost pricing rule in competitive markets. In addition, an incre-
mental-cost pricing rule gives a franchise monopolist an incentive to
choose inefficient technologies if his cost-minimizing joint technology
does not allow him to satisfy an incremental-cost pricing rule in com-
petitive markets. In either case, because resources are wasted in supplying
the franchise-monopoly market, a natural policy implication is that the
monopoly market ought to be opened up to entry. Work by Panzar and
Willig (1977a) indicates that such a market test may backfire. A "true"
natural monopoly may be unsustainable if entry restrictions are lifted.
Sustainability
Panzar and Willig (1977a) have demonstrated that the assumption that
the cost function is subadditive (the "natural monopoly" assumption)
is not sufficient to guarantee that a monopolist will be able to profitably
maintain production of the full set of outputs if free entry is allowed.
A natural monopoly, when faced with entry, may be forced to reduce
its product offerings or face elimination from the market.
In the one-product case, if natural monopoly is unsustainable the effect
of an open-entry rule will be a reduction in output. In the multiproduct
case, when natural monopoly is unsustainable and entry is allowed, theOpen Entry and Cross-Subsidization 341
Figure 7.6 The case of an unsustainable single-product natural monopoly.
resulting equilibrium will feature fewer products. In either case, welfare
(total surplus) could increase or decrease if entry is allowed and the
natural monopoly is unsustainable. Thus, under certain circumstances,
entry restrictions may be required in order to achieve the welfare maxi-
mum.
The sustainability models thus appear to raise troublesome policy
questions concerning the role of entry restrictions in regulated markets.
Many regulated markets exhibit declining average-cost curves and pos-
sible economies of joint production, which may give rise to sustainability
problems. This is especially true where some sort of "networking" is
present, as in telecommunications, mail service, power distribution, and
transportation. In such instances there may be economies from the joint
provision of several "links" in the network.
The question Panzar and Willig pose is: Under what conditions can a
natural monopolist choose a price vector that guarantees that a potential
entrant can anticipate only negative profits if entry is attempted? No
consideration is given to the joint monopolist's reaction to attempted
entry. The justification for this assumption, and the implications of
relaxing the assumption, will be considered later in this article.
Sustainability with One Product
The "natural monopoly" assumption does not require the average cost
curve to be monotonically decreasing. Figure 7.6 depicts a cost curve that
satisfies the subadditivity assumption that the cheapest way to produceBaseman 342
the output y
m is production by only one firm. In such a situation, where
the average-cost curve turns up, the natural monopoly will be unsus-
tainable. For example, an entrant, by choosing p
e, can supplant the
original monopolist. Of course, if the average-cost curve is monotonically
decreasing, the natural monopoly will be sustainable. This result was
first pointed out by Faulhaber (1975b).
Sustainability with Two Products
(Note: Some cases considered by Panzar and Willig are not treated in
this section. "Cooperative" entry and the case of independent demands
will be discussed later.)
The monopolist's outputs are denoted by the vector y
m = (y™,y™).
The monopoly prices are p
m = {p™,p™)- The demand functions are
given by
y? = Q\P
m) a = 1,2)
with
The multiproduct minimum cost function is C(y
m). This cost function
is assumed to exhibit multiproduct scale economies characterized by
least ray average cost; (I/A)C{Xy
m) > C(y
m) for 0 < X < 1). In addition,
the average incremental cost of each output, with the amount of the
other service held constant, is assumed to be declining.
The cost functions available to firms producing only one of the two
products are C(y1,0) and C(0,y2)- These cost functions are assumed to
exhibit declining average costs. Costs are assumed to be subadditive:
C(y
m) = C(y?,y?) < C(yu0) + C(0,y2). (13)
The monopolist's chosen price vector is sustainable against an entrant
offering only one of the products if and only if
Pifi - C{y?) < 0 (i = 1,2),
where p\ < pT^ndy] < Q'iplp™).
Panzar and Willig derived seven necessary conditions for the sustain-
ability of the monopolist's price and output choice. Among those condi-
tions, in addition to subadditivity and cost minimization by the monop-
olist, are the following:Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization 343
• p
m is undominated; that is, there cannot exist a (p\,pl) < {p
with n(p
e) > 0.
• P?y? < C(y?) f°
r i = 1>2. If this condition did not hold, then an
entrant could offers™ at/??
1 and earn non-negative profits.
The second condition is related to Faulhaber's application of the theory
of cooperative games to the problem of cross-subsidization. Multiproduct
monopoly can be viewed as the core outcome of a cooperative cost game
in which the "players" are the consumers of each service (one "player"
is associated with each service). Denote by E{ the revenue allocation
("imputation") assigned to each customer group. The core conditions
require that revenues cover costs, or
t Et > C(y
m),
and that no customer group be charged more than its "stand-alone" costs,
or
Et < C(yT) (i = 1,2).
The second condition requires that the imputation E = {p™y™,p™y™)
be in the core of the cost game. Clearly, it is first required that the cost
game possess a nonempty core.
7 Panzar and Willig show that the assump-
tion of weak cost complementarities is sufficient to ensure that the core
of the cost game is nonempty. Weak cost complementarities require that
the marginal cost of one service not increase with increased output of
any other service.
Given a nonempty core to the cost game, the second condition plus
n
m > 0 require that the market revenues lie in that core. This means
that the demand functions must lie "out" far enough so that the mo-
nopolist can cover its costs (for example, if all demands are zero, market
revenues are clearly outside the core). In addition, market demands
allowing n
m > 0 must contain some points that allow the monopolist
to price below stand-alone cost in both markets. Panzar and Willig
provide some examples which indicate that, when the demands are
insufficient to support independent production of the two commodities,
the monopolist, in order to serve both products, may have to set price
above stand-alone cost in one of the markets. In this section I shall be
concerned only with sustainability problems that arise when the second
condition is satisfied.
8 (Sustainability problems when that condition is
not satisfied are discussed briefly below.)
The crux of the sustainability problem lies in the twin assumptionsBaseman 344
Q
J(pf)
Figure 7.7 The case of an unsustainable natural monopoly that cannot recover the
incremental costs of providing a substitute service.
of single-product economies of scale (for both entrant and monopolist)
and demand substitutability. The first of these effects allows the potential
entrant, facing p
m, to contemplate a substantial price cut in one of the
markets. The potential entrant, looking only at the demand for one of
the products, enters if n
e > 0 can be achieved (the market demand curve
lies above his average cost curve). This gives a new/?, = p% The question,
for the sustainability calculation, is whether the monopolist could have
chosen a vector p
m = (p%pf) that would have yielded non-negative
profits. Such a choice may not have been feasible. The lower price for
service / implies that the demand curve for substitute service j will have
shifted "backward." At lower outputs, the joint monopolist's average
incremental cost (AIC) of providing service j will increase. If the average
incremental cost of providing service j increases "fast" enough, and the
demand curve shifts back "far" enough, there may be no points in
common that allow the monopolist to recover the incremental costs of
providing service j. Such a situation is depicted in figure 7.7.
The move from (p™,yf) to (/?f,>>?) has two effects. AIC,- shifts down,
because production of servicey is now complemented by larger production
of service i.
9 The demand curve for service j shifts back because the
products are substitutes. As drawn, the new demand curve lies nowhere
above the new AIC curve, so the natural monopoly is unsustainable.
Moreover, by subadditivity, the average-cost curve for a firm supplying
only service j lies above AIC,-. Thus, service j will not be provided at all.
The total surplus forgone in market j is the area above pf and below
Q
j(p
ei). If this forgone surplus exceeds the gains in surplus in market /,Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization 345
=0
Pi
Figure 7.8 A sustainable natural monopoly.
then the decision to allow entry will have resulted in a decline in welfare.
In the sustainability calculation, then, the presence of strong product-
specific scale economies for both the entrant and the joint monopolist,
and a large cross-price elasticity of demand tend to favor the entrant
over the monopolist. On the other side, of course, large economies of
joint production tend to favor the joint monopolist.
The sustainability problem is further illustrated in figures 7.8 and 7.9.
Figure 7.8 depicts a sustainable natural monopoly. The region of prices
that could simultaneously support independent production of both
services is denoted R. By subadditivity, the n
m = 0 locus must lie "south-
west" of R. The sustainable range of prices lies on the arc AB. From
any point on that arc (such as the point S), price reductions for either
service cannot move an entrant into a region of non-negative profits.
Figure 7.9 shows an unsustainable natural monopoly. An entrant in
market 2 can, by a large price reduction, come to rest in the n2 > 0
region, thus successfully supplanting the original monopolist. The point
M satisfies all the necessary conditions for sustainability. However, M
is unsustainable against, for example, the point E.
Sustainability with Monopoly Reaction
That a monopolist does not react when entry occurs is a very tenuous
assumption. Panzar and Willig justify the use of the Cournot-Nash
assumption with regard to prices as follows:
.. .the Cournot-Nash expectation need not be self-fulfilling.
Competitive entry would plunge the previously breaking-even monopolyBaseman 346
7r
m =0
Figure 7.9 An unsustainable natural monopoly.
into the red and would necessitate changes in its prices. However, if the
entrant is "small" relative to the industry, the magnitude of these
required adjustments will also be "small" and may hence be justifiably
ignored by the entrant. Also, the entrant may believe that the regulator
would insure that the price adjustments would not be retaliatory with
respect to the entrant's product lines, and that instead the monopolist's
losses would be recovered from changes in prices of services only
tangentially related to the entrant's offerings. (Panzar and Willig
1977a, p. 4.)
The second of these reasons is plausible enough. Regulators have the
power to forbid price reactions, and occasionally have been known to
exercise that power. However, in two of the three versions of the sustain-
ability models presented by Panzar and Willig the entrants are quite
large. With several products, scale economies, and declining average
incremental cost, the entrant must supply more of the product than the
original monopolist had chosen to provide. In the single-product case,
with a U-shaped average cost curve, the subadditivity assumption
requires that the entrant be at least half the size of the original firm.
Successful entry at a smaller scale would violate the subadditivity assump-
tion, implying that we were not dealing initially with a natural monopoly.
Only in the case where the monopolist cannot find (or is not allowed by
the regulator to choose) a price vector satisfying the core conditions can a
small-scale entrant be successful. Discussion of this last case is deferred
until later in the article.
With a large-scale entrant it is reasonable to ask whether the regulator
would or should disallow a price reaction by the monopolist when entry
occurs. The costs of disallowing monopoly reaction can be enormous,
quite apart from sustainability issues. Suppose an entrant can produceOpen Entry and Cross-Subsidization 347
the monopolist's output at a cost only slightly less than that of the
monopolist. If we allow entry and disallow a monopoly price reaction,
the total cost to society of obtaining (approximately) the monopolist's
original output will be the entrant's total costs plus the monopolist's
fixed costs. Also, given the general dissatisfaction with industry perfor-
mance in markets where regulators have restricted price reductions by
firms of roughly equal size, such as airlines, it is at least worth taking
a look at what happens in the sustainability problem when the monopolist
is allowed to react to a large-scale entrant.
With regard to the first reason given in the quote above, there is
something inherently incongruous about an entrant small enough to be
ignored and large enough to drive the monopolist from one of his markets.
Admittedly, the two-product case exaggerates the effect of entry, since
in that case successful entry means that the monopoly disappears. How-
ever, even in the ^-product case, where the effect of entry in any one
market may only be to force the monopolist to offer a smaller product
set, the assumption that the monopolist will not react is noticeably at
variance with the behavior of real-world regulated monopolies.
What I propose to examine is the short-run profit-maximizing response
of the monopolist to attempted entry. It will turn out, not surprisingly,
that the range of situations under which monopoly production is sustain-
able is enlarged substantially. As in the Panzar-Willig model, sustainable
natural monopoly production can be viewed as a Nash equilibrium,
although in this case it is the monopolist's reaction function and not his
price against which the entrant holds the Cournot-Nash expectation.
The monopolist's reaction function will be derived by solving for his
profit-maximizing (loss-minimizing) price and quantity choices, given
the price and quantity choices of the entrant.
To examine the short run aspects of the problem we need to specify
in more detail the monopolist's cost function. Let the cost function be
given by
mi
n C(F,Fi,F2,V, Vx, V2;y™,y2, input prices),
FF^VVV
where F and V are the fixed and variable inputs that are common costs
for both services and F, and V{ are the fixed and variable inputs used
specifically in providing service /. The incremental, or attributable, cost
of providing service / is denoted by IC.
In the short run, the monopolist finds himself already having chosen
F, F1,F2, and F.
1
0 We retain the assumption thstp^y™ < C(y™). How-Baseman 348
ever, given the single-product scale economies, the entrant can contem-
plate offering service 2 at a price lower than the monopolist's current
price. Since the entrant must exploit economies of scale in order to enter,
he is also offering to supply a larger quantity than that provided by the
monopolist. Thus, if the monopolist is to supply any of service 2 at all,
he must at least match the entrant's price.
1
1
The monopolist's profit-maximization problem
1
2 is given by
2





m,P™) ~ y? > 0 (/= 1,2).
The second of the above constraints indicates that the monopolist's
output choice is limited to outputs that can be sold. The Lagrangian for
the optimization problem is
if = n
m + f XilQfipftP?) - yf] + fi(pl ~ Pi)- (15)
The Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions for an interior solution are








= y\ + ^lTZHT + ^2T^ = 0, (17)
dy?
— = Q - yT > 0, A,. > 0, l^Q ~ yf) = 0, (20)
= 0. (21)
Successful entry requires /l2 = 0; otherwise Q
2 — yf = 0 (the mo-
nopolist serves the entire market). We then know immediately fromOpen Entry and Cross-Subsidization 349
equation (19) that the monopolist will set price equal to marginal cost
in market 2.






x/dpf < 0 and y™ > 0 at an interior solution, equation (22)
requires Xx > 0, which carries the unsurprising implication that in a
market unthreatened by entry the monopolist supplies the entire available
demand.
Equation (13) can be rewritten as
|| >0, (23)
which implies, from (21), that the monopolist sets/?™ = pi-




The monopolist's short-run profit-maximizing response to entry is
thus to match the entrant's price and choose the output level at which
short-run marginal cost equals that price.
Of course, in addition to the Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions, the
monopolist's price and output choices must satisfy the standard loss-





where the pvs are the variable input prices.
The effect of the monopolist's short-run response to entry is illustrated
in figure 7.10. We begin with the monopolist choosing an initial vector
of outputs and prices. The point M, with p™ and y™, is assumed to
represent the solution in market 2 to that problem. The choice of y™
and the inputs necessary to produce it also allow us to specify the short-
run average-incremental-cost (AICsr), average-variable-incremental-cost
(AVICsr), and marginal-cost (MCsr) curves shown in the figure.
To position the demand curve for service 2 requires some statementBaseman 350
Figure 7.10 Monopolist's short-run response to entry.
about the monopolist's postentry choice of p™. In general, the sign of
dp™ I dp 2 is indeterminate.
1
3 The monopolist, when faced with announced
entry at p\, could choose to raise, lower, or hold constant /?". To make
things as simple as possible, I will assume that /?" is held constant at
p™. Therefore, the demand curve for service 2 will not shift as a result
of entry at p
e2.
l4~ By the Panzar-Willig criteria, successful entry would be
observed whenever the market demand curve lay above the entrant's
average-cost curve. For example, at E in figure 7.10 successful entry
would be feasible.
Successful entry, given the monopolist's short-run reaction, requires
that the residual demand available to the entrant lie someplace above
his average-cost curve. The residual demand is given by the horizontal
distance between the market demand curve and the monopolist's short-
run marginal-cost curve.
i
 5 The Q
2 market demand curve allows successful
entry at E. The residual demand available to the entrant is shown as the
dashed line D.
Given successful entry in market 2, one can easily verify that, even
with reaction by the monopolist, sustainability is not ensured and entry
may reduce welfare. All one has to do when constructing the demand
and cost curves for market 1 is to make sure the long-run AIC
1 curve
lies well out from the origin and the postentry demand curve is tucked
just inside it, thereby ensuring the long-run infeasibility of continued
service in market 1 and the loss of large amounts of surplus.Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization 351
Thus, even though the monopolist's short-run profit-maximizing
response to entry increases the likelihood of sustainability (because
larger unserved market demands are required for successful entry), that
response by no means ensures sustainability. The troublesome policy
issues concerning open entry remain unanswered, at least on an a priori
basis.
Sustainability with Monopoly Reaction and One Product
The monopolist's reaction to entry in the one-product case is less obvious.
Recall that for a single-product natural monopoly to be unsustainable
the average-cost curve must turn up. This implies that the entrant will be
offering to supply an output less than the monopolist's original output
(Panzar and Willig refer to this as "cooperative" entry). Unfortunately,
in this case we will not be able to derive the monopolist's reaction function
from the new firm's entry "offer." We were able to do so in the preceding
section because the entrant had to offer to supply an output larger than
the joint monopolist's original output. The monopolist then took the
entrant's price as given and chose that quantity which equated his marginal
cost to the entrant's announced price. With cooperative entry, we (and
the entrant) must make an assumption about the monopolist's reaction.
Suppose the monopolist chooses to react along his short-run marginal
cost curve by, again, accepting the entrant's price and setting quantity
so as to equate his marginal cost to the entrant's price. This reaction will




Figure 7.12 Monopoly reaction in the one-product case.
deter entry if costs are subadditive over the market range (and not just
up to the monopolist's output) and if the monopolist's minimum average
variable cost is less than his minimum average cost. Figure 7.11 shows
such a situation. We can check for subadditivity by constructing a new
average-cost curve, denoted AC
e, from a vertical axis at y, the output
at which average cost is equal to the average cost at y
m. As long as the
demand curve lies below AC
e, costs are subadditive over the market
range. Monopoly reaction along the short-run marginal-cost curve then
deters entry by leaving the entrant a residual demand (D — MCsr) that is
less than D — y.
Reaction along the short-run marginal-cost curve is not necessarily
the monopolist's profit-maximizing response to entry. To see this examine
figure 7.12, which shows the demand curve (the discontinuous dashed
line) facing the monopolist when an entrant offers to sell q
e units at price
p
e. If the monopolist matches or beats p
e, the market demand is his.
His profit-maximizing choice is, then, to match p
e and choose quantity
as described above. However, an alternative strategy that might yield
higher profits (or lower losses) would be to set p
m above p
e and allow
the entrant to sell q
e units. This price increase, coupled with a substantial
reduction in output, could allow the original firm to break even. The
entrant would of course raise his price to match p
m; but if he cannot
increase output much past g
e in the short run, this strategy might work
for the monopolist.Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization 353
I suspect that this result is somewhat unlikely and, in any event, clearly
undesirable. The regulator could effectively block it by not allowing
the monopolist to decrease output and increase price in response to entry.
Such a policy would force the monopolist to react along his short-run
marginal-cost function. The sustainability of socially desirable natural
monopolies would then be ensured as long as p
e remained greater than
the monopolist's minimum average variable cost.
Sustainability and Entry Restrictions
We have seen that the Panzar-Willig approach to sustainability problems
can be extended to allow consideration of a monopolist's short-run profit-
maximizing response to entry. Those authors mention that further insight
into sustainability could, and should, be obtained through a dynamic
version of the model and through consideration of nonlinear prices.
1
6
The range of policy options when sustainability is a problem can also
be expanded. The sustainability problem is "merely" another case where
market demand is insufficient to support continued production.
1
7 One
policy solution to that problem is to impose entry restrictions or minimum
price regulation in other markets, so that sufficient excess revenues can
be generated to pay for production in the unsustainable market.
Another policy option is the imposition of a set of taxes and subsidies.
A subsidy, defined either as a certain amount per unit of output or as a
percentage of revenues, could be offered to any firm willing to serve the
otherwise unsustainable market. Presumably, given the economies of
joint production, the market will be served by our joint monopolist.
The revenues to finance this subsidy would come from a set of taxes,
defined in a similar manner, on the remaining products in the industry.
Competition for these remaining markets is thereby feasible, with the
lowest-cost producer serving each market. If the remaining markets do
in fact make up a natural monopoly, then it can be preserved without
resort to entry restrictions. Of course, running such a program would
have its costs. However, there are also social costs—which could be very
large—to protecting an inefficient joint monopolist behind a wall of
entry restrictions.
Sustainability in Intercity Telecommunications: A Short Case Study
The particularly vexatious aspect of the sustainability problem is the fact
that optimal resolution of the public-policy issues may require knowl-
edge of the behavior of demand and cost functions outside the range of
observed price and output choices. This would certainly be true if oneBaseman 354
tried to assess whether large-scale entry were feasible in any market,
since the answer to that question depends on the behavior of demand and
cost cruves beyond the range of current observations.
Fortunately, we may often be able to say something about what happens
in markets where, if entry restrictions were to be lifted, production might
be infeasible, We will often have observations on the long-run average-
cost cruve in such markets. If forgone scale economies are "small" as
output is reduced, then sustainability problems cannot be expected to
arise. Either production remains feasible over widely varying outputs
(in which case a natural monopoly will be sustainable) or, if natural
monopoly is unsustainable, the forgone surplus in the "lost" market will
tend to be "small." Thus, the welfare calculation, in which these losses
must be balanced against the welfare gains in the market where entry
occurs, will tend to favor the postentry world.
An argument along these lines can be put forth in the area of intercity
telecommunications. Waverman (1975) argued convincingly that econ-
omies of scale for microwave transmission are exhausted at output levels
well below the observed outputs of many telecommunications links.
1
8 In
addition, our observation of the market responses of many commercial
telecommunications users to the FCC's "above 890" decision
1
9 verify
that microwave scale economies are small enough so that large individual
commercial users, given appropriate prices, can "go it alone" with pri-
vate microwave.
2
0 Finally, the demand for private line service is a derived
demand for telecommunications as an input. Since telecommunications
expenditures are typically a small fraction of total cost for a firm, one
would expect the demand for private line service to be quite price-inelas-
tic. Combined, these factors suggest that any forgone surplus would be
small if open entry in public message-toll service rendered unsustainable
the continued provision of private line service.
Even without monopoly reaction, the increased surplus accompanying
successful entry in message-toll service would be quite large. For example,
if the scale elasticity for independent production were 1.3, the initial
MTS price advantage over independent production were 10 percent, and
the demand function were linear, increased surplus in MTS would be
half the product of the 10 percent price reduction and an output increase
of one-third. With monopoly reaction, the surplus would be larger, since
the market demand would have to be larger in order to accommodate
the entrant. If the monopolist's short-run marginal-cost curve were
roughly vertical, an output increase of 133 percent would be required to
overcome the initial 10 percent monopoly advantage.Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization 355
To carry this multiproduct interpretation of each telecommunications
link one step further, one can ask why the cost function might be subaddi-
tive. The most plausible reason is economies of scale in transmission.
The various services share the same transmission facilities.
2
1 For a given
level of transmission capacity, the joint monopolist, especially at the ex
ante planning stage,
2
2 can freely alter the mix between private line and
message toll service without forgoing transmission scale economies.
Thus, as the product mix is varied, the average incremental cost of trans-
mission capacity for each service will not change. Therefore, the joint
monopolist will not, for reasons arising from the transmission technology,
run into a declining average-incremental-cost curve when performing the
ex ante adjustment in output mix necessary to deter entry. This implies
that sustainability problems should never arise for private line service,
since the joint monopolist is offering message toll service in addition to
private line service and thus will always be "farther down" the transmis-
sion average-cost curve than any potential entrant offering only private
line service.
Sustainability problems could conceivably arise in message toll service,
since, in addition to transmission, a switching technology must be em-
ployed in order to route each call to the desired destination. The threat
of entry in private line service may force the joint monopolist to reduce
private-line prices. Some users will then shift at least part of their de-
mands from MTS to private-line service. If there are economies of scale
in switching, this demand shift away from MTS will force the joint
monopolist "backward and up" along a declining average-incremental-
cost curve for message toll service. In a qualitative sense, at least, the
stage has been set for the possible infeasibility of continued provision
of message toll service.
Such an outcome is not to be expected. A very substantial body of
message-toll users would not contemplate using private lines at any
conceivable price for private-line service as long as message-toll ser-
vice was available at current prices. The move to private line requires a
large enough demand along any one route to cover the costs of a dedi-
cated circuit. Residential toll users, with small individual demands along
any one route, will prefer MTS to private-line service, even given drastic
price reductions for private line, if a switching technology is available
which allows the pooling of their individual demands at prices close to
current MTS prices. We can infer that such a technology is available
from the variety of switched private-line services currently offered, at
small scales of production, by the specialized common carriers.Baseman 356
Of particular relevance is MCI's "Execunet" service, which is a very
close substitute for AT&T's message-toll service. Execunet is a switched
service, and an Execunet subscriber can place a call to any phone on the
public network in any city served by MCI. Execunet is offered at a scale
that is minuscule in comparison with the scale realized by AT&T for
message-toll service on the same routes.
2
3 I do not have market-share
figures for each firm on a route-by-route basis, but the national totals
give some idea of relative magnitudes. In the fiscal year ending March
31, 1977, MCI's Execunet sales were $28 million (Telecommunications
Reports 1977). AT&T's message-toll revenues in 1975 were $12.9 billion,
of which WATS accounted for $1.4 billion (FCC 1975). Admittedly,
these figures overstate the relative size of AT&T, since MCI does not
offer service on most routes served by AT&T. However, MCI does serve
most high-density routes, and even if one assumes that AT&T derives
only 10 percent of its revenues from routes also served by MCI, MCI's
market share is only 2.1 percent. In addition, at this point the example
is biased against the probability that message-toll service can be provided
at a small scale by a joint monopolist also offering private-line service,
since MCI's private-line volume is but a tiny fraction of AT&T's. Thus,
MCI offers Execunet even though, by hypothesis,
2
4 it must forgo scale
economies in both transmission and switching. The joint monopolist
facing entry in private-line service would be forgoing only whatever
scale economies there are in switching as he attempted to market both
services.
An alternative view of the intercity telecommunications market defini-
tion is that only one product—transmission capacity—is being provided.
The observed rate differentials for a circuit between A and B are then
viewed as evidence of price discrimination. In this one-product world,
nonincreasing average cost is then sufficient for the sustainability of
each link. Scale elasticities greater than unity have been found in virtually
every empirical investigation of telecommunications, so the assumption
is certainly defensible. However, even if subadditivity holds but non-
increasing average cost does not, natural monopoly will generally be
sustainable if the monopolist reacts along his short-run marginal-cost
curve.
If each link is sustainable, can sustainability problems arise across
links? The answer would appear to be no as long as the costs of serving a
collection of links are subadditive, as long as weak cost complementarities
hold across links (that is, the marginal cost of serving link i does not
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are in the core. The demands for service along different links are argu-
ably independent. The demand is for service between A and B; the con-
sumer is indifferent to the prices charged on other routes, since a call to
C cannot be substituted for the desired call to B.
Under these assumptions, proposition 3 of Panzar and Willig 1977a
applies and the natural monopoly network will be sustainable. Since
each link considered alone is sustainable, successful entry on any one
link would require that the lower post entry price pull in consumers from
other links. Independent demand implies that consumers will not move
across links. Thus, the natural monopoly network will be sustainable.
We are left with what could be a source of sustainability problems in
telecommunications. AT&T currently averages its message-toll rates,
with prices on high-density routes set above "cost" and prices on low-
density routes set below "cost." It may be that AT&T, in attempting to
restructure its rates when faced with an open-entry rule, would be unable
to find an initial price vector satisfying the core conditions. In other
words, consumers on low-density routes might be unwilling to pay prices
high enough to cover the average incremental cost of being served.
Whether this is a realistic possibility I cannot say, since the size of the
subsidies arising from nationwide rate averaging is unknown. The size
of those subsidies will depend on the "true" scale elasticity for tele-
communications and on the demand mix of toll users along low-density
routes. The latter factor is important because a toll user along a low-
density route could experience lower toll prices under an open-entry
rule if a large enough fraction of his toll calls were to be carried over
high-density routes.
If toll service in some rural areas proves to be either infeasible or much
more expensive under an open-entry rule, then some source of subsidy
for those consumers may be desirable. As I indicated earlier, there are
ways of providing that subsidy while still allowing entry.
The views expressed are those of the author and should not be taken as representing official
views or positions of the U.S. Department of Justice. John Hoven, Richard Ippolito,
Bruce Owen, Robert Reynolds, James Rosse, and Lee Sparling provided helpful comments
at various stages in my research on these issues. The author is solely responsible for any
errors.
Notes
1. MTS: message-toll service. WATS: wide-area telephone service. AT&T no longer has
a de jure monopoly on MTS. The D.C. Court of Appeals overturned the FCC's ExecunetBaseman 358
decision. Execunet is a close substitute for MTS offered by MCI. The FCC had disallowed
MCI's Execunet tariff on the grounds that MCI had not been authorized to offer public
switched service.
2. Before the FCC, in docket 18128, AT&T proposed as a pricing standard the "Baumol
burden test," which is an extension of the simple incremental-cost test. The "burden test"
shares the deficiencies of the incremental-cost test.
3. The convexity of the isoquants ensures that the second-order necessary and sufficient
conditions for the monopolists's cost-minimization problem are satisfied.
4. I assume that if/)™ = p* the joint monopolist will satisfy the entire demand. This as-
sumption is made for convenience only. Alternatively, I could require p™ < p* — & and
carry the s throughout the analysis.
5. pX is the entry-deterring price in a "friction-free" world without entry barriers. With
entry barriers, the entry-deterring price will exceed p*.
6. When equation (8) is negative the opposite strategy of increasing p™ will not aid the
monopolist, since then />" must increase in the face of competition in market 1.
7. The assumption of subadditivity is sufficient to guarantee a nonempty core in the two-
player game. With more than two players, weak cost complementarities are required.
8. The distinction between the two sources of unsustainability becomes blurred when
consideration is given to the monopolist's reaction to entry. In the Panzar-Willig world,
if the second condition is not satisfied natural monopoly can be displaced by local price
changes. With monopoly reaction a large price cut is needed for successful entry whether
or not the initial prices are in the core.
9. Alternatively, AIC, need not shift down if Cu — 0 over the range of output changes
being considered. In that case, the source of the economics of joint production is a savings
in the inframarginal fixed or startup costs when two services are produced jointly rather
than separately. Thus, although the increasing output of service / may dictate larger fixed
expenditures by the monopolist, the increased use of fixed inputs generates no additional
cost complementarities.
10. To make things simple I am assuming that F and V come in fixed proportions. This
is the case if a fixed maintenance program must be followed to keep a unit of F operating
efficiently.
11. Again, I am assuming that at /?" = p\ the monopolist can supply as much of good 2
as he chooses. The alternative, requiring /?" < p\ — e, yields equivalent results but is less
convenient.
12. The monopolist's problem and solution are precisely the same as the Panzar-Willig
"cooperative" entrant's solution to the problem of what prices and outputs to choose if
entry is considered at less than the monopolist's existing output and the monopolist's
average-cost curve is declining.
13. dpf/dp2 is obtained by totally differentiating equation (17) and solving for dp™jdp2.





15. For prices less than the monopolist's minimum AVIC, the entire market demand is
available to the entrant.
16. I have looked at the sustainability problem with nonlinear prices, but have been
unable to generate any clear-cut results. It is clear that some price discrimination scheme
would, ceteris paribus, increase the likelihood of markets, unthreatened by entry, being
served by the monopolist. However, the effects of nonlinear pricing strategies are unclear
in markets where entry is threatened. The monopolist, by appropriate use of decliningOpen Entry and Cross-Subsidization 359
block-rate tariffs, can inch down the demand curve, leaving a smaller residual demand for
the entrant. However, once the monopolist has positioned himself, the entrant now has the
more powerful tools of price discrimination to get at the available residual demand. The
net effects on the likelihood of entry (and the probability of sustainability problems) are
ambiguous.
17. Regulators now deal routinely with such situations. An example is subsidized air service
on low-density routes.
18. Waverman's work indicates that microwave scale economies are exhausted somewhere
between 1,000 and 4,000 voice circuits, with a cost premium of only a few percent at around
600 circuits. A 100-circuit system could be constructed at a cost premium of about 60
percent. By way of comparison, AT&T's L4 cable system has a capacity of 32,400 circuits.
19. The "above 890" decision allowed telecommunications users, for the first time, to
build and operate their own microwave communications systems.
20. AT&T's response to the "above 890" decision was a substantial price reduction (the
"Telpak" tariffs) to large-volume private-line customers. As a result, there has been very
little investment in private microwave systems beyond that observed before the Telpak
tariffs became effective.
21. If the various services do not share transmission facilities, as would be the case with
physically separate analog and digital transmission systems, then one must search elsewhere
for a source of subadditivity.
22. The substitution can also occur after the system is in place. AT&T currently transfers
existing circuits back and forth between message-toll and private-line service.
23. MCI's operation at a small scale is not inconsistent with scale economies in telecom-
munications. AT&T's rates may be set above "cost" on the high-density routes over which
the firms compete.
24. That is, here we are assuming, for the sake of argument, that the "cream skimming"
explanation of MCI's entry is valid. An alternative view, held by MCI and other specialized
common carriers, is that their entry can be defended because their costs, even at very low
scale, are lower than AT&T's.
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William J. Baumol
My comments are devoted primarily to the first portion of Kenneth
Baseman's illuminating article—the portion dealing with appropriate
tests of cross-subsidization rather than that devoted to the issue of sus-
tainability. This part of his article is entirely critical in character, seeking
to demonstrate weaknesses in the incremental-cost and burden-test
approaches to the construction of criteria of cross-subsidization. As a
general comment, one might have wished that the author had gone
beyond mere criticism, and that he had offered some counterproposals
—tests that in his view are more effective than those to which he objects.
Such an attempt to approach issues more constructively is, of course,
always to be encouraged.
In my view, however, an alternative criterion of cross-subsidization
may not be necessitated by the paper's criticisms. This is not meant to
deny that the analysis has brought to our attention a substantial policy
issue. Indeed, the issue implicitly raised has probably been important
throughout economic history. That issue is governmental grant of
monopoly in cases where it cannot be justified by superior performance
—a topic that has loomed large in the economic literature since the
publication of The Wealth of Nations. What I will undertake to show
is that it is this issue, and not the adequacy of the proposed tests of cross-
subsidization, with which Baseman's analysis deals. Rather, I will show
that in the circumstances envisioned in the paper the marginal-cost test
of cross-subsidization performs exactly as one would wish it to, and that
the problem the examples raise is that of a monopoly franchise unjusti-
fiably granted.
While the paper presents a number of variants of its argument on
cross-subsidization, I will deal only with the simplest example, since it
brings out the issues so clearly.
In the example in question, Baseman examines a case in which there
are diseconomies of scope—it is more expensive to have a single firm
produce both of two commodities than to have the same quantities pro-
duced separately by two specialized firms. The monopolist's total cost
of producing the two items together is 90, and the incremental cost of
each item is only 20. Each item can be produced by a specialized com-Baumol 362
petitor at a total cost of 40. The unspecialized firm has a monopoly
franchise in commodity 2 and therefore fears no competition in this
market. It sets a price of, say, 35 for the competitive product, good 1,
thoroughly exceeding its incremental cost, and covers the remainder
of its 90 cost by charging a price of 55 for its monopoly product, good 2,
thereby depriving the consumers of the opportunity of buying the good
from a specialized firm at 40. Clearly, the consumers of good 2 are
burdened by the arrangement.
But the story, as told so far, obscures the true source of the burden.
To make the issue clear, instead of considering only the case in which
there is a monopoly franchise, let us examine two possibilities: that in
which entry is prevented by law (the monopoly franchise) and that in
which entry is free. In each case we contrast the results of an incremental-
cost floor for competitive product 1 with those of a full-cost floor for
that product, where for illustration it is assumed that consumers of
each good must then be charged half their 90 total cost (each must pay
45). The results are summarized in the following table.
Legal monopoly in market 2












Consider first what happens if there is a legal monopoly franchise in
good 2. Under the incremental-pricing regime, as before, the consumers
of good 1 pay 35 and the consumers of good 2 pay the residue, 55. But
with full-cost pricing the firm loses its market for good 1, and customers
of the monopolized product will then have to pay both the fixed cost,
50, and the incremental cost, 20. That is, the monopoly product's cost
will rise from 55 to 70, because of the loss of the contribution of 15 in
excess of incremental cost which product 1 would otherwise have
provided.
Now consider the case where entry is free. Then, if in order to meet
competition in product 1 the unspecialized firm charges 35 for that
product under an incremental-cost floor, it will simply be unable to
maintain its market for product 2, for either it will charge 55 and lose
that market to an entrant or it will charge less than 40 and go broke.
Ultimately, the unspecialized firm will be driven from both markets,
for it cannot survive serving only market 1 at a price of 35.Comment on Baseman 363
With entry, the same will happen under full-cost pricing. Indeed, what
must ultimately happen with free entry is that the unspecialized firm
will be unable to remain in either market, and that is just as the public
welfare requires.
Arithmetic arguments can be confusing, yet it is easy to draw a number
of general conclusions from this discussion:
• The consumer is obviously poorly served in the case illustrated in the
Baseman paper, but this is because the firm has been granted a
monopoly in a market where there is no cost justification for such a
grant. Thus, under an incremental-cost regime customers are not as
well off as they might otherwise be. But they are worse off still under
full-cost pricing, which forces both customer groups to pay more than
under incremental-cost pricing.
• If despite the absence of any cost justification the government is
determined to impose a monopoly in market 2, then the issue is what
pricing scheme minimizes the resulting damage. It is easy to see that it
is the incremental pricing scheme.
• Under these circumstances it is simply wrong to say that incremental
pricing introduces cross-subsidization by the customers of the
monopoly product. Given the idiotic decision to impose the monopoly
in market 2, under a ceiling on total company profits the customers of
the monopoly product are better off when the competitive product 1 is
sold at any price above incremental cost that is low enough to keep the
competitive market for the unspecialized firm, for then the competitive-
market sales make a net financial contribution to the company and
consumer payments for the monopoly product must be reduced
accordingly.
• Most important for the current discussion, pricing based on an
incremental-cost test achieves the right results in either of the two cases,
the case in which the monopoly is imposed in market 2 and the case
where it is not. In the first case it saves money for both customer
classes; in the second case it drives the unspecialized firm out of
business, as it deserves because of its relative inefficiency.
I conclude from all this that tests of cross-subsidization can and must
be incremental in character. To say that the sale of a product benefits
from a cross-subsidy means that its sale is at the expense of the customers
of other products. But if the product in question contributes net revenues
in excess of its net incremental costs, then surely its market is not being
served at the expense of the customers of other products, whether or not
those other products have a protected monopoly.
Finally, I should like to emphasize the desirability of further work on
both subjects raised by the discussion: criteria that can be used to iden-
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sharpening of the tests of cross-subsidization. With regard to the latter,
while I believe firmly that appropriate tests will have to be based on a
comparison of incremental revenues and costs, there is, as always, room
for further improvement in the testing procedures that have so far been
designed. I hope that the author of the article will turn his considerable
abilities to these issues.
I thank the National Science Foundation for its support of the writing of these comments.Comment
John C. Panzar
My comments will deal with the second half of Mr. Baseman's article,
in which he discusses some alternative approaches to the theory of
monopoly sustainability and some of the policy issues involved.
The author's exposition of the essence of the sustainability problem
for the two-product case is intuitive and concise. I was particularly in-
trigued with his diagrammatic use of the average-incremental-cost
curve to show why the monopolist may not be able to match the price
cut of a single-product entrant and still break even (figure 7.7). This
device is a useful complement to the Panzar-Willig price-space diagram
of figure 7.9. The use of such a price-quantity diagram also makes clearer
the structural similarity of the sustainability problem to the literature
on entry deterrence. Since the bulk of the paper's analytics are devoted
to Baseman's attempt to develop an alternative to the Nash behavioral
assumption underlying the Panzar-Willig analysis of sustainability, it
may be worthwhile to develop a little perspective on this issue.
Anytime one attempts to model a potential entrant's decision problem,
it is necessary to make some assumption about what the entrant per-
ceives will be the response of the monopolist to his entry. The limit-
pricing theory of Bain and Sylos, for example, was based upon the en-
trant's assuming that the monopolist would keep his output constant in
the face of entry. The theoretical results of such models are, of course,
quite sensitive to the behavioral assumptions employed, and debates in
the literature tend to focus upon whether one assumption is more or
less "reasonable" than another.
When discussing a regulated industry, it would seem that such debates
are beside the point, since postentry price responses can be controlled
by the regulator. In principle, allowable price responses can therefore
be known objectively by all potential entrants, and the nature of such
allowable responses becomes an important policy issue. In this light, it
becomes evident that the policy tradeoff between the salutary stimulus
that free entry may provide for efficiency and innovation and the possi-
bility of wasteful, duplicating entry cannot be analyzed independently
of regulatory price-response policy. Two extreme examples should help
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• "Predatory pricing," if allowed as a response to entry, may deter
many entrants who in fact possess superior technology or products.
• Welcoming entrants into the regulatory "fold" through favorable
price adjustments will certainly lead to wasteful entry. (In Baseman's
figure 7.8, even the point S may not be sustainable if the entrant
perceives that the regulator will allow it and the original monopolist
to "come to rest" at the southwest corner of R.)
The sustainability discussion of Panzar and Willig, then, is best inter-
preted as an analysis of the potential problems with a policy of free
entry given that the regulator does not allow a price response—the
simplest such regulatory policy to analyze. It demonstrated that there
may indeed be serious problems with a policy of open entry under that
condition. Therefore, an important direction for additional research is
to examine open entry and sustainability under meaningful alternative
assumptions about the responses to entry the regulatory will allow the
monopolist to make. The goal of such analyses would, of course, be to
determine whether or not a proposed policy tends to make sustain-
ability problems more or less severe. While I believe Baseman's model
to be a step in this right direction, I do have a few comments to make
about his analysis and choice of regulatory scenario.
Baseman assumes that the entrant expects the regulator to allow the
monopolist to respond to entry in a manner that maximizes his profits
in the short run. In the light of the above discussion, is this an interesting
policy alternative to analyze? In the first place, it is difficult to reconcile
the short-run behavior of the monopolist with the (presumably) long-run
concerns of the entrant. Perhaps the entrant is only interested in earning
some short-run profit, but unless for some unexplained reason the tech-
nology he uses is extremely fungible he must also consider the possibility
of losing some of his investment when the monopolist makes his long-
run response. Put another way, what is the regulator's policy to be
toward the (initial) monopolist in the long run? Will he prevent the
monopolist from adjusting his input choices indefinitely? Baseman is not
at all clear on these points.
Second, would it ever make sense for the regulator to adopt such a
policy? Baseman raises this question in connection with the no-response
scenario, but offers little in the way of justification for his own model
in this regard. Presumably, the fact that regulation is effective means
that there are unexploited profits to be had, even in the short run. This
might induce some form of collusion between the monopolist and po-
tential entrants, since tolerating some entry in market 2 may provide
the opportunity to reap large profits in market 1.Comment on Baseman 367
Finally, Baseman's basic conclusion that "the monopolist's short-run
profit-maximizing response to entry increases the likelihood of sustain-
ability (because larger unserved market demands are required for suc-
cessful entry)" depends upon the assumption that the monopolist does
not choose to raise the price in the unthreatened market. If he did, the
market demand for service 2 might shift out far enough so that even the
entrant's residual demand would exceed the original (constant p^) market
demand. In view of this difficulty and the above discussion about un-
exploited profits, it may be more interesting to analyze the model by
explicity assuming that the regulator allows the monopolist to change
only the price in the service- threatened by entry. Unfortunately, if the
monopoly is unsustainable, it is easy to show that the monopolist cannot
lose part of market 2 and break even in the long run without raising the
price in market 1. While hardly conclusive, Baseman's discussion has
indicated the usefulness of modeling alternative price responses to entry
in a sustainability framework.
Another potential policy option for dealing with the sustainability
problem that Baseman mentions only briefly involves taxes and subsidies.
I find this concept quite intriguing analytically, so let me briefly elaborate.
Consider the unsustainable situation depicted in figure 7.9. If it is required
that any firm serving market 2 pay a (lump sum) penalty and that an
equal bonus be paid to any firm offering to serve market 1, the II
2 > 0 set
will "shrink" and the II
1 > 0 set will expand, without affecting the
IT
m = 0 locus. (Baseman discusses per-unit or ad valorum taxes and
subsidies, which, while they may be easier to administer, introduce an
additional price distortion into the analysis.) It is at least possible that
the situation of figure 7.9 may thereby be "transformed" into that of
figure 7.8, which would lead to the emergence of a region of sustainable
prices. The same scheme could also be used, in principle, to allow move-
ment from one sustainable price vector to a socially preferred, but pre-
viously unsustainable, set of prices (for example, in figure 7.8, from S to a
point to the left of A). These possibilities are illustrated in the accom-
panying diagrams. In (a), there are initially no sustainable price vectors.
However, after the imposition of an appropriate tax-and-subsidy scheme
has shifted the IT
1 = 0 and n
2 = 0 loci to the positions indicated by the
dashed lines, all prices on the Il
m = 0 locus are sustainable. In (b), a
tax-and-subsidy policy has shifted the sustainable region from BCD to
ABC, allowing the regulator to choose a price vector between A and B
if he finds it to be socially desirable.










































Movement to previously unsustainable prices.Comment on Baseman 369
Baseman's analysis. Baseman's heuristic empirical argument suggests
that sustainability is not likely to be a problem in intercity telecommunica-
tions. Even if his perceptions are correct, there is a great need for addi-
tional empirical work in this area on which to base intelligent policy
analysis. The knowledge that there exist one or more sustainable price
vectors is, in and of itself, of little use to the policymaker. The relevant
question is whether or not there are any socially desirable prices which
are sustainable, If not, the decisionmaker faces a tradeoff between the
benefits resulting from a policy of open entry and the concomitant loss
of pricing flexibility. The important insights to be gained from Baseman's
paper are that the terms of this policy tradeoff may be improved through
the implementation of appropriate tax-and-subsidy schemes and through
alternative regulatory policies toward allowable postentry responses by
the multiproduct monopolist.
The views expressed in this comment are solely those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect those of Bell Laboratories or the Bell System.